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How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
Can genealogical explanations affect the space of reasons? Those who think so
commonly face two objections. The first objection maintains that attempts to
derive reasons from claims about the genesis of something commit the genetic
fallacy—they conflate genesis and justification. One way for genealogies to
side-step this objection is to focus on the functional origins of practices—to
show that, given certain facts about us and our environment, certain conceptual
practices are rational because apt responses. But this invites a second objec-
tion, which maintains that attempts to derive current from original function
suffer from continuity failure—the conditions in response to which something
originated no longer obtain. This paper shows how normatively ambitious
genealogies can steer clear of both problems. It first maps out various ways
in which genealogies can involve non-fallacious genetic arguments before
arguing that some genealogies do not invite the charge of the genetic fallacy if
they are interpreted as revealing the original functions of conceptual practices.
However, they then incur the burden of showing that the conditions relative to
which practices function continuously obtain. Taking its cue from the genealo-
gies of E. J. Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker, the paper shows
how model-based genealogies can avoid continuity failures by identifying
bases of continuity in the demands we face.
ABSTRACT
A gainst the widespread view that explanations of how somethingoriginated—genealogical explanations—are normatively inert,1
I argue in this paper that genealogical explanations can be used to
affect the space of reasons. I do this by showing how genealogies can
overcome two objections thought to form stumbling-blocks for norma-
tively ambitious genealogies purporting to subvert or vindicate their
object. The first objectionmaintains that attempts to derive reasons from
1 See, inter alia, Dutilh Novaes (2015); Finken (2012); Fraser (1981); Glock (2008a;
2008b, p. 101); Goudge (1961); Hamblin (2004, p. 45); Hanson (1967); Hoy (1994);
Kaplan (2002, p. 13); Kim (1990); Koopman (2013, p. 20); Rosenbaum (2002); Wiener
(1946). The widespread view is that genealogies can advance our understanding of
philosophically puzzling concepts, but that they do not directly justify or debunk
them (Dutilh Novaes 2015, pp. 100-101).
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claims about the genesis of something commit the genetic fallacy—they
conflate genesis and justification.2 There are basically two ways of
side-stepping this objection. One is to show that the genealogies in
question involve non-fallacious genetic arguments; the other is to show
that correctly understood, these genealogies do not invite the charge of
the genetic fallacy, because they do not really involve genetic arguments
at all. In the interest of thoroughness, I will indicate viable versions of
both strategies,3 and also defend genealogies with normative import
against the main charge they run into when they are not interpreted
as involving genetic arguments. I will first map out various ways in
which genealogies can involve non-fallacious genetic arguments. I will
then show that some genealogies do not invite the charge of the genetic
fallacy if they are interpreted as genealogical inquiries into the func-
tional origins of our conceptual practices (a catch-all termmeant to cover
concepts, values, virtues, and other practices of epistemic and normative
assessment). On the reading I shall offer, these genealogies can yield
pragmatic vindications of these conceptual practices by showing how,
2 This objection was raised against Bernard Williams’s genealogy by Colin Koopman
(2013, p. 20). For further discussions which see the genetic fallacy as clouding the
prospects of normatively ambitious genealogical explanations, see Finken (2012);
Fraser (1981); Glock (2008a; 2008b, p. 101); Goudge (1961); Hamblin (2004, p. 45);
Hanson (1967); Hoy (1994); Kaplan (2002, p. 13); Kim (1990); Koopman (2013, p.
20); Rosenbaum (2002); Wiener (1946). For more optimistic assessments, see Crouch
(1991, 1993); Dutilh Novaes (2015); Klement (2002); Lavine (1962); Sober (1994); Ward
(2010).
3 This two-pronged approach takes care of the lack of consensus over what counts
as a genetic argument and what counts as a genetic fallacy: any given normatively
ambitious genealogy either involves a genetic argument or it does not; if it does,
section 1 lays out how this argument can avoid the genetic fallacy; if it does not,
the genealogy is not at risk of committing the genetic fallacy in the first place; but
then—so I argue—it is likely to be at risk of foundering on continuity failure (which
on some understandings would also count as a form of the genetic fallacy); if it is,
section 3 lays out how such a genealogy can avoid continuity failure; either way,
it emerges that neither the genetic fallacy nor continuity failure are insuperable
stumbling-blocks for normatively ambitious genealogies.
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given particular facts about the needs of concept-users in particular
circumstances, certain conceptual practices are rational because apt
responses.
As a result of this functionalist interpretation, however, these ge-
nealogies invite a second objection akin to the charge of the genetic
fallacy. The objection is that genealogies which try to derive current
from original function suffer from continuity failure—they founder on
the fact that the conditions in response to which something originated
no longer obtain.4 As Nicholas Smyth (2017) has recently argued in
response to the genealogies of Richard Joyce (2006), Jesse Prinz (2007),
and Philip Kitcher (2011),5 ascriptions of current functionality on the
basis of genealogy are warranted only if the conditions relative to which
something was originally functional still obtain, and Smyth suggests
that these genealogies founder on continuity failure.
A successful genealogy with normative import must therefore
steer clear of the genetic fallacy without foundering on continuity
failure. A model for how to do this, I argue, is provided by the state-
of-nature-based genealogical inquiries into the point of individual
concepts and virtues offered by E.J. Craig (1990), Bernard Williams
(2002), and Miranda Fricker (2007). I suggest that these genealogies
are best read as making ascriptions of current functionality based on
genealogical inquiries into structural origins, i.e. into facts about us and
our environments that our practices are rooted in and arise in answer
to.6Although these genealogies can drawon historical information, they
4 Smyth (2017). I discuss Smyth’s objection in detail in §2.
5 Looking beyond disciplinary boundaries, one might also include Jonathan Haidt
(2012), Joshua Greene (2013), and Michael Tomasello (2016).
6 Yet they are not inquiries into transcendent and “immobile forms” preceding the
flux of history of the kind that Foucault (1971) rejected in favour of inquiries into
the multiple causes of the emergence of things. For more on Foucault’s notion
of emergence, see Koopman (2013, pp. 39–44). For a conciliatory discussion of
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are closer to dynamic model-building than to standard historiography.7
Yet they are still properly called genealogical. This comes out if we
contrast them with their explicitly non-genealogical sibling that Fricker
went on to develop: these so-called paradigm-based explanations take
an actual paradigm case of a given practice, hypothesise its point
given the needs of actual parties to the practice, and explain further
cases of the practice as elaborations of the paradigm case serving the
same point in different ways.8 The genealogies of Craig, Williams, and
Fricker differ from paradigm-based explanations in two respects: first,
they set out from constructed models or idealised prototypes of our
practices rather than from the actual practices themselves; and second,
they introduce a developmental axis to understand how and why we
might have gotten from these prototypes to the practices we in fact
have. In contrast to paradigm-based explanations, these genealogies
start out from a primitive form of a solution to a basic problem that
is not and indeed could not be actual in a stable way (which is why
a fictional construct is called for). For example, Williams begins his
genealogy with prototypical forms of truthfulness—“Accuracy” and
“Sincerity”—which, at the beginning of his genealogy, are understood
in purely instrumental terms as means to foster the flow of information,
Foucault’s critique of the search for “origins” in relation to the genealogies of Craig
and Williams, see Fricker (Forthcoming). As Fricker also notes, the key point is that
their genealogies are concerned with practical necessity rather than metaphysical
necessity.
7 This focus on genealogies that are interpretable as primarily constituting a form of
model-building rather than a form of documentary historiography is the reason why
I do not explicitly discuss the better-known genealogies of Nietzsche and Foucault
(although the broader discussion of the genetic fallacy in section 1 implicitly
encompasses them as well). This is not to deny that at least where Nietzsche is
concerned, some genealogical passages may be amenable to such an interpretation.
But arguing the point here would take us too far afield. For readings of some of
Nietzsche’s early genealogies in this direction, see Queloz (2017b, Forthcoming-a,
Manuscript).
8 See Fricker (2016, Forthcoming).
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but prove unstable as long as they are sustained only by instrumental
concerns. The value of starting from such an idealization lies in the
stark simplicity with which it brings out the functional pressures that
both require a solution along these lines and require it to develop
beyond that primitive form.9 But this approach is genealogical not only
in considering these functional origins. It is also genealogical in two
further respects: first, in considering the primitive form’s elaboration in
response to further generic needs anticipatable from within the model
(in Craig’s genealogy, this is exemplified by the gradual “objectivisation”
of the concept of knowledge, i.e. its development into a concept that is
less directly tied to subjective needs);10 and second, in considering the
primitive form’s elaboration in response to increasingly socio-historically
localneeds. Basedonhistorical information,thegenealogical explanation
is progressively tailored to the practices that we have, now and around
here (in Williams’s genealogy, this is exemplified by the elaboration of
Accuracy to encompass statements about the distant past in response to
developments inAncientGreece,or by that of Sincerity to encompass the
demand for authenticity in response to developments in the Romantic
period).11 If the genealogist ends upwith something sufficiently like our
local form of the practice in question, he or she will have a reasonable
claim to having explained why we might have come by the practice in
terms of its original point and subsequent elaboration in response to
historically situated needs.
9 ContraMcGinn (2003), the genealogical dimension is thus more than a colourful but
ultimately superfluous illustration. I offer a fuller defence of Williams’s genealogy
against this objection in Queloz (Forthcoming-b).
10 Craig (1990, chs. 10-12; 1993, ch. 3).
11 Williams (2002, chs. 7-8). Here, as he puts it, philosophy must involve itself in history
in order to achieve what it sets out to achieve (2002, 93). Another example of a
functional genealogy that is progressively tailored to a particular socio-historical
situation is Williams’s derivation of the modern liberal idea of liberty from a generic
and primitive idea of freedom (Williams 2005b).
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Such a reading of the genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker
raises many questions worth pursuing, but in this paper, I shall restrict
myself to just one aspect: how these genealogies suggest a way of
tackling the problem of continuity failure. My contention will be that
they put us in a position to reveal a practice’s functionality for us while
deriving the need for the continual discharge of that function from
persistent facts about the kinds of creatures we are. Such genealogies
thereby avoid assuming continuity in the practical demands we face,
because preciselywhat they are is attempts to identify bases of continuity
in those demands. They are not arguments depending on continuity, but
arguments for it.
1. Two Ways of Connecting Origin and Justification
For our purposes, the genetic fallacy can be understood as the error of
treating items in the context of formation of conceptual practices as if they
belonged to the context of justificationwhen in fact they do not.12 We can
acknowledge that there is such an error without committing ourselves
12 This understanding is adapted from Salmon (1973, p. 11). Alternative character-
isations of the genetic fallacy maintain that it consists in judging the truth of an
assertion on the basis of its source rather than by the evidence or argument available
for it (Kaplan 2002, p. 13), or conflating temporal or historical origin with logical
nature (Hamblin 2004, p. 45; Koopman 2013, p. 20; Rosenbaum 2002; Wiener 1946).
Glock defines it as “the mistake of deducing claims about the validity of a theory
or the content of a concept from information about its historical origins, including
information about the causes of its emergence” (2008b, p. 101). TheOxford Dictionary
of Philosophy defines it as “any mistake of inferring something about the nature of
some topic from a proposition about its origins” (Blackburn 2016). Inferring current
from ancestral function is also sometimes described as a genetic fallacy (Dennett
1995, 465). Finken (2012) even brings the acceptance of a belief for pragmatic reasons
under that heading. Hanson (1967) argues that these various uses share nothing
but their name and the fact that they involve some kind of inference from historical
statements to statements which are not merely historical. Similarly, Goudge (1961)
claims that there is no single mistake in reasoning which goes by the name of
“genetic fallacy”; rather, the name designates a cluster of mistakes associated with
the giving of genetic explanations.
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to the much stronger claim that nothing can be inferred about the
justification of something solely from facts about its origins.13 Items in
the context of formation can form part of the context of justification, but
they can properly do so only if there is a connection between an aspect
of the context of formation and the justification of the item in question.
What is fallacious is not the inference from origins to justification
per se, but the inference from irrelevant information about origins to
justification. Andof course,whether somepiece of information is relevant
to the justification of a given conclusion is often precisely what is at
issue. What normatively ambitious genealogical explanations depend
on, then, is that there be such a connection rendering some aspect of
the context of formation relevant to the context of justification.14 The
charge of the genetic fallacy thus serves as a reminder that contexts of
formation and contexts of justification are distinct spheres. Yet there
may be overlaps—peculiarities of one sphere which lead it to extend
13 This is argued at length by Sober (1994). Other defences of genetic reasoning include
Klement’s (2002) vindication of a certain form of self-referential abductive reasoning.
Ward (2010) sees a role for modest, inductive genetic reasoning: it acts as a corrective
against prejudice by calling into question (without conclusively undermining)
justifications coming from particular sources. Lavine (1962) offers a defence of a
functionalist version of genetic reasoning: to understand the function of something
requires understanding what it is functional for, and this in turn requires relating it
to the situation to which it answers. For a qualified defence of genetic reasoning
relating the history to the philosophy of science, see Hanson (1967). For a similarly
qualified defence of genetic reasoning in the context of feminist philosophy, see
Crouch (1991). Crouch (1993) also offers a more general defence by problematising
the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification.
14 Pashman (1970) argues that relevance depends on there being a causal link between
the context of formation and the context of justification. But in many cases, no
such philosophically neutral ways of determining relevance will be available: the
Archimedean standpoint is lacking (Crouch 1993; Srinivasan 2015). Crouch argues
that it should not be surprising that philosophies that draw on Marxist or Freudian
explanations seem to commit the genetic fallacy. The genetic fallacy was formulated
largely in opposition to just the kinds of assumptions on which these theories
depend. Feminist theories, insofar as they accept these assumptions, will also appear
to commit the genetic fallacy. Crouch (1991) offers a nuanced evaluation.
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into the other. As this image already indicates, this can happen in one
of two ways. Either the space of reasons is itself such that it locally
encompasses certain formation processes; or these formation processes
are such that knowledge of them can contribute to the vindication or
subversion of their objects. Either we have genetically justified practices,
or we have genealogies yielding justifications.
Take genetically justified practices first. Claims about the formation
processes of conceptual and evaluative practices may affect the space of
reasons because these claims concern practices whose authority is itself a
function of their formation.15 That is to say, formation processes are part of
the truth conditions of the propositions fromwhich the practice derives
its authority. We may call practices which understand themselves or
claim authority for themselves in terms which knowledge of their
formation can undermine genetically justified practices. Examples of such
genetically justified practices abound in politics and law, where it is
common for practices to derive their authority from the procedure by
which they were formed. In a democracy, for instance, a decision might
be legitimated by the fact that it is the product of a democratic procedure.
Similarly, many rituals and traditions justify their continuation by
reference to their authoritative origins—things are done a certain way
because some respectedoriginator of the ritual or tradition did them that
way. A particularly striking example is the Catholic notion of apostolic
succession, according to which the spiritual authority of present-day
clerics derives from the uninterrupted transmission (through successive
popes and bishops) of the original authority of the Apostles. Indeed, it
is characteristic of religious practices that they revolve around wide-
screen representations of their own origins from which they derive
their self-understanding and authority.
15 See Williams (2014b, p. 410) and Gutting (2005, p. 50).
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In all these cases, genealogical explanations can impinge on the
space of reasons because the rational articulation of the conceptual and
evaluative practices in question itself refers to their formation. Whether
a practice is genetically justified or not is something to be determined
by looking at how it presently functions. When practices are genetically
justified, however, this justificatory connection to their own formation
renders them susceptible to vindication and subversion by genealogical
explanations. The structure of such vindications and subversions will
then be as follows:
Vindicatory Genealogy of a Genetically Justified Practice:
Conceptual practice P understands itself or claims authority for itself
in terms of a representation RFP of its own formation process FP.
Inquiry into how FPmight have given rise to P suggests that RFP is
true.
Therefore, the authority of P is to that extent vindicated.
Subversive Genealogy of a Genetically Justified Practice:
Conceptual practice P understands itself and claims authority for
itself in terms of a representation RFP of its own formation process
FP.
Inquiry into how FPmight have given rise to P suggests that RFP is
false.
Therefore, the authority of P is to that extent subverted.
I take it that this is the standard way in which genealogy has been
thought to overcome the genetic fallacy: by exploiting the fact that the
target phenomenon understands itself and claims authority for itself in
terms which a genealogy can undermine. For example, liberalism has
been claimed to be the product of reason’s march through history—the
rationally inevitable endpoint of a historical process of becoming alive
to universal reasons.16 A genealogical inquiry into the actual formation
16 This is a point of contention between Thomas Nagel (1997, 2009) and Bernard
Williams (2014a), for example. Williams writes: “[W]hen it is argued that the values
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process of liberalism might throw doubt on this representation, and
thereby subvert the authority liberalism claims for itself in terms of the
march of reason. More generally, a genealogy can sap the authority of
beliefs or ideas by revealing their contingency insofar as these demand
authority for themselves in terms that are incompatible with that
contingency.
This is not to deny that genealogy can also have more indirect
effects on authority.17 Even when a practice appears normal, natural, or
necessary without its authority depending on its being taken to be so,
genealogical inquiry can enable a critical reevaluation of authority. It
primarily does this by showing that people can live differently, because
they have lived differently. Generating this sense of alternatives pulls
aside the veneer of inevitability. This is not itself a subversion of
authority. But, as Elizabeth Anderson has put it, it converts dogmas into
tools that we can choose to use or not (2001, p. 22). It turns dogmatic
acceptance into critical assessment.
However, there are other ways in which genealogy can impinge on
the space of reasons which we miss if we focus only on contingency.
These other ways are not a matter of how practices claim authority for
themselves, but of how and why they originated. This is where we turn
from genetically justified practices to genealogies yielding justifications.
of contemporary liberalism cannot possibly be criticised in terms of their history, this
will be so only to the extent that those values can be separated from the claim—one
which is often made for them—that they have emerged from the spread of reason
and represent a cognitive achievement” (2014b, p. 410). See Queloz (2017a) for
further discussion.
17 Koopman (2013, p. 95) provides an illuminating account of this broadly Foucauldian
employment of genealogy as initiatory rather than constitutive of critique. He argues
that it is not so much the fact that, but the way in which something contingently
arose which will be of interest, because it is only the latter which makes explicit and
opens up to critique the enabling background assumptions of the practice (2013, p.
21).
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In this second way of connecting origin and justification, it is not the
justificatory structures, but the formation processes themselves which
are such that knowledge of them can contribute to a vindication or
subversion of practices, or simply exhibit them as rationally contingent.
Let us say that a practice P is rationally contingent to the extent that the
considerations contributing to the best explanation of why a group G
engages in P fail to provide reasons to prefer P over possible rivals to
P, where possible rivals to P are unrealised alternatives to P competing
for the place in our lives occupied by P, and notably include the
abandonment ofP. We can then distinguish threeways inwhich insights
into the formation process of a practice can bear on our understanding
of it:
Vindicatory Genealogy:
Group G engages in conceptual practice P.
The best explanation for why G engages in P is that P is the result of
formation process FP.
FP is vindicatory, i.e., it offers reasons to prefer P over possible rivals,
including the abandonment of P.
Therefore, the continuation of P is to that extent justified.18
Non-Vindicatory Genealogy:
Group G engages in conceptual practice P.
The best explanation for why G engages in P is that P is the result of
formation process FP.
FP is not vindicatory, i.e., it fails to yield reasons to prefer P over
possible rivals, including the abandonment of P.
Therefore, P is to that extent rationally contingent.
18 Here I am generalising to conceptual and evaluative practices a pattern of genetic
reasoning spelled out by Klement (2002, 390). Klement construes abductive genetic
arguments for the truth of a given belief p as having the following form: Person(s) S
believes p. The best explanation for why S believes p is that S’s belief that p is the
result of belief-forming process f. Belief-forming process f is highly reliable, i.e., it
produces true beliefs much more often than it produces false beliefs. Therefore, S’s
belief that p is true.
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Subversive Genealogy:
Group G engages in conceptual practice P.
The best explanation for why G engages in P is that P is the result of
formation process FP.
FP is incriminating, i.e., it offers reasons against the continuation of P.
Therefore, the abandonment of P is to that extent justified.
Two noteworthy features of this construal are that it is abductive and
tripartite. There are two reasons for reconstructing the genealogies
at issue here as a form of abductive reasoning (i.e. reasoning to the
best explanation). The first is that it enables us to offer genealogies
even where we do not have knowledge about how a given practice
actually came about (knowledge which a sound deductive argument
would require). The second reason is that to give a sound non-abductive
version of the argument, one would need to have established that P
is the result of formation process FP, which in turn presupposes the
existence of formation process FP, and this is likely to beg the question
against those who dispute that Pmerits respect and continuation. On
the abductive reconstruction, by contrast, the argument is available
even in the absence of knowledge; and the existence of the practices
acts as evidence for the existence of the formation processes imbuing
them with authority.19
As for distinguishing three possible forms by including the possi-
bility that a genealogy may simply prove non-vindicatory, this points to
19 For this reason, Klement speaks of self-referential abductive reasoning (2002, p. 392).
An example is the ending of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, where Levine perceives his
own moral values as evidence for the truth of divine revelation, which in turn
vindicates those values (Tolstoy 2014, Part VIII, chs. 12 and 13). Another example is
Descartes’s argument for the existence of God in the Third Meditation: among the
contents of his consciousness, Descartes finds, is the concept of unified perfection,
i.e. the concept of God; this concept of unified perfection, he maintains, could not
have come from something less than perfect; since he himself is imperfect, the best
explanation for his having the concept of God is that it was implanted in him by
God himself, as the mark of the maker stamped on his work (Descartes 1996, 3.51).
See Williams (2005a, pp. 134–137) for further discussion of this argument.
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an important feature of genealogies that take conceptual or evaluative
practices rather than beliefs as their objects. We saw that genealogies
of genetically justified practices included only two rather than three
possible forms. This is because genetically justified practices are matter
of representing formation processes as being a certain way. These
representations obey the principle of bivalence: they are either true or
false. If a genealogy fails to yield evidence that a certain representation
of formation processes is true, this will be prima facie evidence of its
being false. Hence, genealogies of genetically justified practices will
tend to be either vindicatory or subversive. But if we start at the other
end, i.e. with the formation process of concepts, values, and practices,
we get three rather than two possible argumentative structures. This is
because concepts, values, and practices are neither true nor false. They
can, however, be evaluated: there can be reasons for or against living
by those practices rather than by possible alternatives. They can be
more or less apt tools for fulfilling our purposes. But this allows for the
possibility that certain aspects of our ways of going on are rationally
contingent (and even where our having some form of a practice or
concept is not rationally contingent, the specific form it takes in our own
cultural situation may be). Hence, a genealogical explanation of how
we came to live by a given concept, value, or practice may yield reasons
in favour of it, reasons against it, or neither.
This third outcome—finding that our conceptual and evaluative
practices are rationally contingent—need not be destabilising. It simply
indicates that the practice is rationally contingent, in the sense that it
is not justified against possible rivals.20 And as Wittgenstein pointed
out, to use something without justification does not mean to use it
20 That genealogies need not be normatively determinative is the central point in
Koopman (2013, ch. 2).
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wrongfully.21 With conceptual and evaluative practices, the absence
of reasons for or against is a stable result which need not be due to
epistemic limitations on our part. While it is constitutive of beliefs that
they aim at the truth, our tools and practices of sense-making do not
aim at being rationally vindicated against all possible rivals. It is a
mistake to take contingency to be in itself an objection to our concepts
and values. The impression that contingency is problematic derives
from two related, but equally erroneous ideas: (i) that we must strive
for the set of sense-making practices that is absolutely best; and (ii) that
we must do so as characterless selves completely unencumbered by
the contingent influences of cultural and biographical circumstance.
Against these ideas, we can insist that our task is not to find the concepts
and values that are best from a point of view that is as free of contingent
historical perspective as possible.22Wewant the sense-making tools that
best make sense of the world to us; but whatmakes sense to us is in turn
a function ofwho we are and of which concepts shape our concerns, both
of which are largely matters of contingent biographical and historical
circumstance; this is not a constraint to be overcome, but rather what
enables our sense-making in the first place. The sense-making self
cannot be separated from everything that it contingently is—it is not,
in the first instance, biased by historical processes, but constructed by
them.23 There is no characterless self (and even if there were, it would be
spectacularly ill-equipped to do what is expected of it). Consequently,
it is not an objection to our concepts and values that they are local and
contingent. The aim is not that they should be ultimately and timelessly
21 Wittgenstein (2009, §289).
22 I take it that this is the point whichWilliams (2006, pp. 193–194), in a difficult passage
of “Philosophy as Humanistic Discipline,” urges against Rorty (1989, chs. 3–4).
23 Williams (1993, pp. 158–159).
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desirable, but that they should have a point for us. This is why revealing
their contingency is not in itself subversive.
We thus have two ways of connecting origin and justification: either
claims about the origins of practices may affect the space of reasons
because these claims concern practices whose authority is itself a
function of their formation, or the formation processes themselves
are such that knowledge of them can contribute to a vindication or
subversion of the practices. Revelations of contingency can sap the
authority of practices in the former case, but contingency is normatively
inert in the latter case. However, it does not follow that there are no
instances of the latter case. Formation process can be authoritative, i.e.
they can offer reasons to prefer a practice over possible rivals, and hence
genealogies can have normative force independently of how practices
claim authority for themselves. The connecting element is the notion of
function, which straddles the space of causes and the space of reasons.
The question then is how insights into formation processes can yield
reasons via insights into functionality.
2. Functionality and Continuity
There aremanyways of looking at formation processes.We can trace out
the meanderings of historical development, date and locate key stages,
and map out intricate webs of interconnections between processes. But
we can also take a more functional approach and try to identify the
salient stabilising factors that led to certain features being retained
in virtue of their aptness in serving certain ends. This will reveal the
functional origins of the practice, the more or less contingent facts it is
rooted in and which it forms a pragmatic response to. This way lies the
path from origin to vindication that will be my focus here: genealogy
can be vindicatory by yielding a pragmatic vindication—by showing
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that, given certain needs and purposes and given certain facts about us
and our environment, certain ways of going on are rational because apt
responses.24
Genealogies in this vein try to connect contexts of formation and
contexts of justification via functionality. If the question arises, in
any given case, whether a conceptual or evaluative practice should be
continued, a genealogy can try to answer the question by revealing
the function of the practice in relation to our needs and purposes. It
does this by presenting the practice as rooted in a set of conditions
which together generate a problem to which the practice constitutes
a solution. The genealogy thereby shows the practice to be in one
sense contingent and in another sense necessary. It shows it to be
contingent upon humans and their environment being a certain way;
but it also shows it to be practically necessary given these facts, since
the challenge they give rise to exerts a strong pragmatic pressure on
the remedying practice to arise. If our interest in telling the genealogy
is merely historical or explanatory—a matter of grasping how a certain
practice could possibly have arisen without divine interference, for
instance—this will already be enough. But the genealogy will have a
more than merely explanatory upshot to the extent that we have reason
to think that the root conditions still obtain. Insofar as they do, this will
suggest that our present cultural situation involves similar dynamics,
and that our present token of the original practice, marked and altered
by various contingencies though it may be, still functions, at base, as a
response to this same predicament.
24 In the sense that a community of practice will have reason to cultivate the practice. My
use of the term “rational” is not meant to mark a distinction between the normativity
of reasons and the normativity of rationality as drawn, for instance, by Kolodny
(2005).
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The guiding idea of such genealogies is to use insights into why a
practice originated—insights yielded by genealogical explanation—to
generate insights into what the function of the practice now is. If the
function is one we need to see discharged, we shall to that extent have
a reason to continue engaging in the practice. If, on the other hand, the
practice is one which we do not need to see discharged, we shall have
been provided with a reason to abandon the practice. This is an attempt
to side-step the genetic fallacy by using the context of formation as a
guide to current functionality, which is in turn a relevant consideration
when it comes to the practice’s justification. A successful inference of
this sort, which moves from origin to justification via functionality,
involves two steps: one from reflection on how and why a practice
originated to its original function; and one from its original function to
its current function.
But while the first inference seems easy enough, the second holds
difficulties. These difficulties have been clearly brought out by Smyth’s
(2017) critique of inferences from the original function to the current
function of morality.25 Smyth argues that if ascriptions of current func-
tionality on the basis of genealogy are to be warranted, the conditions
relative to which something originally was functional must still obtain.
Smyth thinks, however, that the conditions relative to which the ge-
nealogists he discusses take morality originally to have been functional
no longer obtain. Therefore, their genealogically derived ascriptions of
functionality to contemporary morality are not warranted.26
The key difficulty for function-oriented genealogies, then—the
“functionalist’s burden,” as Smyth calls it—is that they presuppose
25 The genealogists Smyth focuses on are Kitcher (2011), Joyce (2006), Sinclair (2012),
and Prinz (2007), though there is a suggestion that the same difficulties extend to
Hume (2000) and Williams (2002). See Smyth (2017, pp. 1130n4, 1131).
26 Smyth (2017, pp. 1137–1138).
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continuity in the conditions relative to which a practice is functional.
For our purposes, we can reformulate this constraint as follows:
Continuity:
Necessarily, for any P, G, and RCi : if {RC1 , RC2 , . . . RCn} is the set of
root conditions relative to which practice P was originally functional
under some description, then the inference from the original function
of practice P to its current function in group G is justified only if
{RC1 , RC2 , . . . RCn} also obtains in G.
When this constraint is not met, genealogically derived ascriptions of
functionality exhibit what Smyth calls continuity failure (2017, p. 1137).
The attempt to side-step the genetic fallacy by using the context of
formation as a guide to current functionality then founders on the fact
that the context of formation does not exhibit enough continuity with
the present to inform the context of justification.
Smyth acknowledges that there might in principle be a level of
description at which root conditions exhibit the continuity necessary to
justifying genealogically derived ascriptions of current functionality: we,
like our ancestors, live in groups and need to get along and solve various
coordination problems (2017, p. 1134). But on Smyth’s reconstruction
of Kitcher’s (2011) and Joyce’s (2006) genealogies, the conditions that
they in fact appeal to as explanantia stand no chance of obtaining today.
Kitcher’s explanation only holds for small groups (50 to 150 individuals)
in which the probability of a renewed encounter is relatively high and
the influence of a given interaction on future interactions is accordingly
important—the “shadow of the future,” as game theory has it, looms
large in each interaction.27 Smyth points out that as society grows, the
importance of this effect dwindles. Modern societies no longer fulfil
the conditions that do the explanatory work in Kitcher’s genealogy
(2017,p. 1134). Similarly, Joyce’s explanation invokes conditions inwhich
27 See, e.g., Lange, Klapwĳk, and Munster (2011).
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resources are so scarce that individuals cannot afford to sacrifice greater
long-term for lesser short-term gains; and in which group stability is
so fragile that any selfish free riding would be severely detrimental to
the group’s functioning. Again, Smyth sees neither condition fulfilled
in modern society (2017, p. 1137).
Yet even if continuously obtaining conditions could be identified,
Smyth argues, this would have to be at the cost of their explanatory
force—the assumption being that morality would be highly unlikely to
evolve in the sort of large-scale, relatively secure, and resource-abundant
societywe live in (2017, p. 1137). Hence, no conditions sufficiently broad
to be met by such a modern society would be of help in explaining
why morality arose. Smyth’s conclusion is that moral genealogists must
choose between explaining morality’s emergence and uncovering its
current function. If they go for the former, they will diagnose morality’s
functionality relative to conditions which no longer obtain. If they
go for the latter, the most promising genealogical path to functional
ascriptions will be one which focuses on modern history rather than
on our Pleistocene ancestors; but then they will learn little about why
morality originally arose. They cannot have it both ways.
Two qualifications are in orderhere. First, genealogies do not depend
on Continuity being satisfied society-wide. It may be enough if the
conditions in response to which a practice arose exhibit only partial
continuity in certain sub-domains of society, such as the family or
the football-club. Second, it is precisely the point of some function-
oriented stories about how our practices originated that Continuity
fails to obtain—in recent years, evolutionary psychology has pursued
the idea that certain traits originated as functional adaptations to an
ancestral environment which markedly differs from our present-day
environment, leaving us with many dysfunctional tendencies or biases.
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Nevertheless, Smyth is surely right that the Continuity constraint
is the crucial hurdle for genealogies aiming to reveal the current func-
tionality—as opposed to dysfunctionality—of practices, and if Smyth’s
critique applies not only to Kitcher’s (2011) and Joyce’s (2006) genealo-
gies, but to all genealogies in this vein, it seems that they can avoid the
genetic fallacy only at the cost of foundering on continuity failures. Yet
as we shall see, the genealogies of Craig (1990), Williams (2002), and
Fricker (2007) indicate how genealogy can avoid continuity failures.
3. Avoiding Continuity Failures
There are two ways in which genealogies can avoid continuity failures.
The first is to operate at high levels of description which abstract away
from the particulars of given token situations and bring into view
features extending over a wide range of situations. Call this the high
level of description strategy. The second is to show that the need for the
practice in question—the focal practice—has a firm basis in and derives
from basic needs humans can be assumed to have anyway. Call this
the anchoring in human nature strategy. Both of these labels will seem
rather off-putting to readers suspicious of sweeping generalisations or
speculative just-so stories about human nature. Yet while the labels may
be alarming, I shall argue that the strategies they label are executed in
ways that make them reassuringly modest in the commitments they
undertake.
The genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker pursue both of
these strategies together: they focus on the general and anchor it in
the basic. For the sake of clarity, we can prise these two strategies
apart. The first strategy of these genealogists is to operate at such a
high level of description that they do not (in the first instance) make
reference to any particular point in history at all. They start out from
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what philosophical tradition has come to call, perhaps misleadingly, a
“state of nature.” But this is not a depiction of life in the Pleistocene.
Nor is it any other point on the timeline of history. It is best understood
as amodel, an idealising representation of functional dynamics at a level
of abstraction familiar from game theory and rational choice theory.28
The state of nature depicts how a set of root needs under certain root
circumstances generates further needs, including, centrally, a focal need
to which a prototypical form of the practice we are interested in—the
focal practice—constitutes a rational because functional response. At
this level of abstraction, the model is no more a model of one point on
the timeline of history than of any other. As Craig notes: “Reference
to mankind’s prehistory was no essential part of my argument” (2007,
p. 192). What his genealogy was meant to show was that “the core of
the concept of knowledge is an outcome of certain very general facts
about the human situation” (1990, p. 10). Similarly, Williams insists that
the state of nature is “not intended to represent some early hominid
environment” (2014b, p. 411). Rather, it is part of “a fictional storywhich
represents a new reason for action as being developed in a simplified
situation as a function of motives, reactions, psychological processes
which we have reason to acknowledge already” (2000, p. 159). And
Fricker, who takes up and develops Craig’s and Williams’s state-of-
nature models, understands the device as a “maximally ahistorical
setting,” a construct designed to characterise our most basic needs and
what they entail (2007, 108–9). This means that the state of nature can be
as much a model of the present as of a given earlier society. Given this,
the question is not so much whether one can, in principle, infer from
that model to the present—that comes for free with its being a model of
a timespan that includes the present: it is the point of the model that
28 See Kusch (2009, 2011, 2013) and Kusch and McKenna (Forthcoming) for a reading
of Craig’s genealogy along these lines.
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it permits this kind of inference. The question is whether it is a good
model.
Such model-based genealogies make ascriptions of current function-
ality not on the basis of claims about a certain period in our past, but on
the basis of generic models of ourmost general predicaments. Insofar as
they are genealogies at all, they are genealogical inquiries into structural
origins, i.e. into the highly general facts about us and our environments
that our practices are rooted in.29 Model-based genealogies can eluci-
date and vindicate a practice by presenting it as structurally rooted in,
and in that sense as originating in, a set of conditions, the root conditions,
which together generate a focal need to which the focal practice constitutes
a solution. The root conditions appealed to by Craig, Williams, and
Fricker—a need for information about p, or a need for cooperation
in φ-ing—are so highly general and abstractly characterised that they
can be plausibly be thought to obtain in anything recognisable as a
human society. This is how the high level of description strategy aims
to secure continuity: by characterising the functional dynamics out of
which practices arise and by which they are held in place at a level of
abstraction which renders them applicable to an extremely wide range
of situations.
The second strategy aims to provide reasons for thinking that the
functional dynamics in question are at work in our present situation.
It does this by anchoring the focal need in question in the most basic
demands of human nature. This is why these genealogies typically start
29 There are of course other philosophical methods that deploy generic models and
general facts, and I would not wish to claim that all of these methods are specifically
genealogical. Rather, I claim that a specific set among the various philosophical
enterprises that call themselves “genealogical” is really best understood as being in
the business of making sense, in the light of generic models and general facts about
the kind of creatures we are, of why we came to think and value as we do. I am
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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out from what we take ourselves to know about human beings and
their situation quite generally. We can grant that humans have had very
different goals and interests at different times, but some of their most
basic needs can plausibly be thought to exhibit more continuity. Craig
starts out from needs “so general . . . that one cannot imagine their
changing whilst anything we can still recognize as social life persists”
(1990, p. 10; 2007, p. 191). Williams also seeks to ground his genealogy
in “universal considerations” (2002, p. 172), in “motivations that people
must be granted to have anyway” (2002, p. 33). And Fricker speaks
of “absolutely basic epistemic needs” (2007, p. 112), and remarks that
genealogies can help us understand how our present practices form
contingent manifestations of our most basic predicaments (1998, p. 165).
It is true that substantial commitments will thereby be undertaken
about what kinds of creatures humans are and what kinds of environ-
ments they live in. Genealogical explanations, like all explanations,
have to start somewhere and take certain things for granted. But there
are two respects in which Craig, Williams, and Fricker execute their
genealogical narratives in a way that allows them to take as little for
granted as possible. They do not simply settle on a practice and then
paint an innate need for just that practice into our picture of human
nature.
On the one hand, what they take for granted are structural needs like
the need to gather and share information about the immediate environ-
ment or the need to avoid conflict: these are second-order needs that grow
out of the relations between individuals’ first-order needs (such as their
need for various types of foods, goods, and tools). Structural needs are
to a large extent counterfactually robust, because they are overwhelmingly
insensitive to the content of first-order needs—almost irrespective of what
their first-order needs are under given circumstances, humans will
have a strong interest in gathering and sharing information about their
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immediate environment and in avoiding conflict.30 If there are any
needs that we can be confident humans beings have anyway, structural
needs are good candidates—if only because they already grow out of
the most trivial human needs, such as the need to locate and have access
to sources of water.
On the other hand, these structural needs then form a basis from
which to derive further needs, showing how one practical exigency
entails the next, until one reaches the need to which the focal practice
forms a direct functional response. The need for the focal practice is
thus not simply postulated as being part of human nature, but shown to
be entailed by more primitive and less controversial needs. This way of
proceeding sets the genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker apart
from much-maligned just-so stories about human nature such as that
of Randy and Nancy Thornhill (1983, 1992), which raised eyebrows by
declaring “men’s tendency to rape” to form an innate part of human
nature.31 The genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker are more
modest in their assumptions in that they demonstrably but fallibly
derive the needs they are interested in from structural needs that raise
no eyebrows when presented as in some sense inscribed in human
nature.
There is apoint to this anchoring in humannature strategy, inparticular,
when focal needs we are less confident we have can be derived from
root needs we are more confident we have. It may not at all be obvious
that we need the concept of knowledge, the virtue of truthfulness, or
30 Indeed, there is a limit to how different a form of life can be while remaining
intelligible as a variation on ours. Differences must ultimately be made sense of in
terms of similarities—variations on human life are only recognisable as such against
the backdrop of a shared set of features that make them variations on human life.
31 SeeHufendiek (Forthcoming) for a nuanceddiscussion of this andother controversial
inscriptions of traits into human nature and of how these have been exploited as
bases for the critique of naturalism in the nature-nurture debate.
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the virtue of testimonial justice, because they perform functions which
render them indispensable to creatures like us. When questions arise
overwhetherwe should continue to cultivate these conceptual practices,
or whether wemight and perhaps should abandon themwith impunity,
for instance because we suspect them to be fetishised relics of a not yet
thoroughly disenchanted world, revealing these practices’ instrumental
relations to some of our most basic needs acts as a powerful vindication
of them: it frees them of suspicion by showing them to be rooted in basic
human needs and thereby (in a sense I shall come back to) provides
reasons for us to continue to cultivate these practices.
These genealogies thus try to meet the Continuity condition by
offering reasons to think that the focal practice is continually required
and held in place by focal needs to which it responds, and that these
are derivative of needs so basic that human beings can be assumed to
have them anyway. The question raised by Continuity is whether we
now have such focal needs, and rather than to simply assume that this
is the case, these genealogies provide an argument to the effect that the
focal needs are rooted in and constitute structural corollaries to certain
basic roots needs which can more plausibly be assumed to be needs
we have anyway. They try to meet the Continuity condition by offering
reasons to think that the focal practice is continually required and held
in place by needs to which it responds, and that these are derivative of
needs so basic that human beings can be assumed to have them anyway.
Where these instrumental relations between a given practice and our
basic needs is not transparent to us, genealogical explanations offer
perspicuous derivations of the need for a certain practice from needs so
basic and so general that they can, with some plausibility, be assumed
to be continuous over extremely wide ranges of situations, including
ours. The genealogies thereby give us reason to think that the focal
needs are indeedwith us. This does not free us entirely from the burden
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of making substantial assumptions about human nature, but it greatly
reduces the load. It highlights the respects in which a given element
of our present cultural situation forms a practical response to a basic
predicament. It shows it to be rooted in functional dynamics that are
most perspicuously represented with the help of a prototypical practice,
the present manifestation of which, marked and altered by history
though it may be, still functions, at base, as a response to this same
predicament. The anchoring in human nature strategy thus aims to
secure continuity by deriving the focal need to which the focal practice
responds from basic needs humans have anyway.
The importance of these two strategies to the success of model-
based genealogies becomes particularly apparent if their argumentative
structure is laid out as follows:
Model-Based Genealogy:
(P1) In a prototypical group G, a set of root needs RN1 − RNn under
root circumstances RC1 − RCn generate a practical problem.
(P2) This generates a pragmatic pressure on G to solve the problem:
the focal need FN.
(P3) Prototypical practice Pwould meet the focal need FN by discharg-
ing function F.
(P4) P could develop quite naturally, i.e., out of the capacities we are
prepared to grant G anyway, via the set of steps S1 − Sn .
(C1) Therefore, Pwould be bound to develop in any G that persists.
(C2) Therefore, it is rational for G to engage in P in order for F to be
discharged in G (in the sense that people with these needs under
these circumstances would welcome and, if they could do so, aim
for engagement in Pwith a view to the discharge of F).
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(P5) In the actual group G∗, there are close analogues to RN1 − RNn
and RC1 − RCn , namely RN∗1 − RN∗n and RC∗1 − RC∗n .
(C3) Therefore, it is also rational for G∗ to engage in P∗, the closest
analogue to P in G∗, in order for F to be discharged.
(C4) Therefore, the best explanation for why we go in for P∗ is that it
discharges function F.
(C5) Therefore, there is a prima facie reason for G∗ to continue P∗, and
P∗ is to that extent vindicated.
This reconstruction lays out how model-based genealogy affects the
space of reason by showing us that given that we share certain needs,
we have reasons to engage in certain reasoning-practices. What the
reconstruction of model-based genealogies also brings out is that their
soft underbelly is P5,which assumes that the root needs and root circum-
stances in fact obtain in our present situation. It is this premise which the
two strategies aim to strengthen: the variables RN1-RNn and RC1-RCn
are assigned to facts about human beings and their environment that
stand a good chance of obtaining anyway, i.e. independently of the
particulars a given situation, because they are basic structural facts
about the human situation picked out under highly general and abstract
descriptions.
The danger for this way of proceeding is that the explanations
will end up being too abstract and general to be informative. It is no
coincidence that genealogies in the vein of Craig, Williams, and Fricker
take a piece-meal approach: instead of trying to identify, wholesale,
the function of entire domains of human thought and action, they
proceed one concept at a time, singling out a particular thread within
the tangle of our conceptual practices—such as knowledge, truthfulness,
or testimonial justice—and following it to its moorings in the needs
of concept-users. Although this may not be a necessary condition
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on the method’s effectiveness, it contributes to it in two ways. On
the one hand, informativeness is likely to decrease as the level of
description at which the genealogy works increases in abstraction.
Moreover, as we saw Smyth acknowledge, securing continuity will
already require working at a fairly high and abstract level of description.
This suggests that the way to maximise informativeness while retaining
continuity is to keep the object of investigation narrow and concrete by
philosophy’s standards—to try and show that any society will need a
particular concept or value in order to solve a specific, well-delineated,
and perhaps even formalisable coordination problem rather than to
show that any society will need some form of ethical consciousness in
order to solve coordination problems in some form. On the other hand,
working piecemeal leaves room for the idea that our practices may be
an assemblage of individually functional elements, each tailored to
its specific purpose, which do not all fit together into a harmonious,
functional whole.32 Insofar as this is the case, it must mean that we are
bound to miss the tensions and conflicts between practices that cannot
be pressed all the way together if we do not work piecemeal; and it
gives further succour to the idea that insofar as morality as a whole can
be said continually to perform a function at all, that function is likely to
be too indeterminate to retain much informative value.
In sum, genealogies stand a good chance of overcoming continuity
failures if they (i) derive functional conclusions not from the Pleistocene,
or from any other however vaguely situated period in hominid history,
but from highly abstract functional models; (ii) use these models to
identify the focal practice’s structural roots in basic human needs and
what they entail; and (iii) take a piece-meal approach. The conclusion
supported by a successful enterprise along these lines will be that
32 A point which Williams, following Isaiah Berlin, presses in several places (1981;
2011, p. 170).
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some practice we now engage in forms a functional response to a basic
problem—that it serves a point relative to needs we are bound to share.
Such genealogies avoid continuity failures, because they operate at
a high level of description while anchoring the focal needs on which
their functional ascriptions depend, and which prima facie do not seem
likely to exhibit the necessary continuity, in more basic needs, which
do. They make ascriptions of current functionality, not on the basis of
claims about a certain period in our past, but on the basis of abstract
models of our most basic predicaments. The ascriptions of functionality
are then genealogically derived from structural origins rather than from
historical origins, though if the structures in question are as continually
part of the human situation as the state-of-nature model represents
them as being, these structural origins will in turn help us understand
the practice’s actual historical origins. The crucial point, however, is that
these genealogies do not assume continuity in the practical demands
we face, because precisely what they are is attempts to identify bases of
continuity in those demands. They are not arguments depending on
continuity, but arguments for it.
It follows from such a broadly functionalist construal of the method
of genealogy that it will be, in the first instance, vindicatory. Asking
why we go in for a certain practice first points us to the respects in
which it does something for us. It would of course be Panglossian
optimism to think that this is the end of the story. As research on the
emergence of so-called “bad norms” indicates, there are many ways
in which functional dynamics can issue in something that does more
harm than good.33 But for our present concerns, the important point
is that a genealogical explanation satisfying the Continuity constraint
would entail that however much harm a practice may cause, it must also
33 Brennan et al. (2013, ch. 8); Rosenberg (2016).
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still continually prove its worth as a response to the basic predicament
which the genealogy represents us as facing in virtue of our sharing
certain basic needs.
The precise relation of functional insights to normative conclusions
is notoriously complex, and I cannot hope to fully explicate it here, but I
want to close with three observations about the general shape that this
relation takes in model-based genealogies. First, at the most general
level, what these genealogies do is to reveal how some practice helps us
to live, which they achieve by taking something we are less confident we
need (e.g., the concept of knowledge, the value of truth, or the virtue of
epistemic justice) and deriving it as a practical corollary from something
we are more confident we need (e.g., information about our immediate
environment). This can be thought of as a non-foundationalist strategy:
eschewing attempts to derive the concepts we should live by from
absolute rational foundations in Platonic Forms or universal reason,
it instead tries to foster allegiance to certain conceptual practices by
showing that they promote material that already commands broad
allegiance. The uncontroversial and basic human needs that figure at the
root of Craig’s, Williams’s, and Fricker’s genealogies are paradigmatic
examples of such material. Few will be disposed to deny that we have
these needs; what they might be disposed to deny is that these needs
bring with them certain problems that certain conceptual practices in
turn equip us to solve; and this is where the genealogical derivations
come in, as narratives designed to bring out just how these conceptual
practices in fact serve ends that the narratives’ addressees are already
fully committed to pursuing.
Second, the normative force of these functional insights will be
limited in various ways: they can give us reasons to cultivate certain
concepts and values tout court, but they cannot give us reasons for
particular actions or beliefs—they cannot tell one, say, whether to be
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truthful to someone on a particular occasion. The insight into the
basic functionality of a system of epistemic division of labour based on
the virtues of truthfulness, as Williams himself notes, by itself “takes
us nowhere at all” (2002, p. 84) insofar as we want to know, when
the question arises with regard to particular pieces of information,
whether we should continue to work the system. A related limitation
derives from the fact that the reasons yielded by genealogies will
often—roughly, whenever the practical value of my doing something
lies in its value to others rather than to myself—be in the first instance
reasons for the collective to cultivate certain practices rather than reasons
for the individual to participate in those practices.
Yet neither limitation brings the normative force of such genealogies
down to zero, especially on a realistic picture of who their addressees
might be. When genealogies’ addressees are real people rather than
creatures from the demonology of philosophy, such as the complete
amoralist, they can provide reasons for the individual by providing
reasons for the collective, notably via the thought that if everyone always
defected, the beneficial practice would break down. This imagined
universalisation is itself an ethical thought, and will therefore be no
help against the amoralist.34 Yet when the addressee is someone who
is already part of an ethical community, but whose confidence in a
particular practice is wavering (due perhaps to suspicions fostered by an
austere naturalism or by postmodern irony), a genealogy can increase
that individual’s confidence in the disposition to engage in certain
conceptual practices and to treat certain considerations as reasons.35
What Williams thought was true of any attempt to justify the ethical
34 See Williams (1973, pp. 252–253; 2011, p. 31).
35 Such reasons to cultivate dispositions remain importantly different from pragmatic
reasons for belief in the sense of reasons purporting to show directly that a given
statement is true. The reasons I am concerned with are reasons to think in terms of
certain concepts at all, whereas the reasons at issue in recent debates over pragmatic
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life is certainly true of genealogical vindications: their “aim is not to
control the enemies of the community or its shirkers but, by giving
reason to people already disposed to hear it, to help in continually
creating a community held together by that same disposition” (2011,
p. 31). Genealogies are not instruments of conversion. But they can
promote self-understanding, and thereby strengthen the confidence of
those who are, in some measure, already disposed to think and value
in terms of the concepts which the genealogies address.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that such genealogies need not focus
exclusively on instrumental reasons. They can also accommodate and
strengthen our confidence in non-instrumental reasons. Williams’s
state-of-nature model, for example, shows us that nearly any human
community has instrumental reasons to encourage dispositions of
truthfulness (in the prototypical form of dispositions of Accuracy and
Sincerity) in its members, because this contributes to the efficient
pooling of information and thus, in the long run, to the welfare of
each member. But a purely functional explanation which leaves it at
that is bound to be unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the explanation
will jar with the manifest fact that for us, truthfulness, like justice or
loyalty, is more than a means to an end. Reducing it to its instrumental
value unduly ignores its intrinsic value. On the other hand, if we
persist in understanding truthfulness in purely functional terms, we
have trouble seeing how it could have been stable enough to fulfil its
purpose: if people were truthful only for instrumental reasons, the
practice of truthfulness would become vulnerable to free riders. Why
should one, on a given occasion, exhibit dispositions of truthfulness
that promise to pay in the long run if by making an exception, on this
particular occasion, one can reap some extra benefits for oneself without
reasons for belief are primarily reasons to think that particular contents articulated in
terms of given concepts are true (see Reisner (2009, Forthcoming) for an overview).
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compromising the communal practice of truthfulness?36 This familiar
line of thought is all the more devastating in the case of truthfulness,
since the practical value of my truthfulness—especially the practical
value of my Sincerity—lies predominantly in its value to other people. To
escape this free rider problem and to stabilise truthfulness, therefore,
“there should be some dispositions to think that telling the truth (to the
right people, on the right occasions) is in itself a good thing” (Williams
2014b, p. 408). Only in communities in which people are disposed
to assign value to truthfulness per se, thus ceasing to see it as merely
functional, can this conceptual practice fulfil its function. Itmust outgrow
its mere functionality in order to be functional: intrinsic reasons are
required that will give one reason to be truthful even when doing so
involves forsaking opportunities for personal gain in other respects. By
helping us understand this, model-based genealogies can explain why
and, by involving themselves in history, how and in connection with
which other values we came to think in terms of intrinsic reasons now
and around here (some cultures make sense of the intrinsic value of
truthfulness in terms of honour; others in terms of freedom).37
36 This echoes Williams’s critique of indirect utilitarianism (2011; 1973): the recom-
mendation of non-utilitarian rules on strictly utilitarian grounds is unstable under
reflection due to the lack of fit between the spirit of the justification and the spirit it
justifies. A structurally similar argument that focuses on the threat of unintelligibility
rather than instability is advanced by Müller (2003). But the difficulty is not peculiar
to utilitarianism: Gauthier’s (1986) argument that reflection provides players in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma with a rational basis to acquire dispositions to justice suffers
from the same difficulty. As Williams puts it, the “lack of fit between the spirit of
justification and the spirit being justified is so radical that, if the construction is
exposed to reflection at all, it is bound to unravel” (2002, p. 91). Kolodny (2005) also
discusses the problem: “Why is there reason to follow, in this particular case, the
rule that promises utility over the long run, if violating it, in this particular case,
promises even more utility?” (p. 543). Like Williams, he comes to the conclusion
that what is needed to move the individual is an intrinsic reasonto follow the rule on
each and every occasion (pp. 544-45).
37 See Kusch (2009) and Reynolds (2017) for an account of how a similar structure can
be discerned in Craig’s genealogy of the concept of knowledge.
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Among the strengths of such genealogies is their capacity to avoid
emphasising instrumental reasons at the expense of non-instrumental
reasons. As Craig pithily puts it, “with genealogy, we need neither
overstress nor overlook function” (2007, p. 198). Genealogies offer
us “explanation without reduction” (Williams 2002, p. 90), providing
functional explanations of why we came to engage in certain practices
which, by highlighting the uses of intrinsic values or the benefits of
being “bloody-minded rather than benefit-minded” (Williams 2002,
p. 59), issue in vindicatory explanations of our having further, non-
instrumental or intrinsic reasons to engage in those practices. This falls
short of yielding intrinsic reasons we did not have before. But the aim
of a genealogy like Williams’s is not to give truthfulness intrinsic value;
it is to vindicate it as the intrinsic value it already is: to give it a bill of
health, showing that it makes sense that creatures like us should accept
considerations connected to truthfulness as intrinsic reasons in order to
strengthen the addressees’ confidence in those reasons.38
The conclusion we reach is that there are genealogical paths from
origin to justification which neither commit the genetic fallacy nor
suffer from continuity failure. I have focused in particular on sketching
an interpretation of the genealogies offered by Craig, Williams, and
Fricker as model-based genealogies tailored to the task of showing
that a practice we might have thought of as a contingent outgrowth
of our local situation and history in fact functions as an indispensable
response to continual practical exigencies. I have argued that this
involves an inference from the structural origins of a practice in a
generic predicament to the modest but genuine vindication of our local
manifestation of it. Such an inference might still be wrong, of course.
38 Spelling out more fully how and in what sense exactly genealogical explanation can
vindicate new reasons for action as given by intrinsic values requires a paper of its
own. I offer a fuller picture of Williams’s way of doing it in Queloz (Forthcoming).
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Yet on the interpretation offered here, the problem will then not be that
it has subtly trespassed against the canons of reasoning, but simply that
it is unsound.
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